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ABSTRACT
I show that dual trading has no aggregate market impact because
total trading volume, market depth and price efficiency are all
unaffected by a ban on dual trading. However, trading volume and gross
(of commission fees) profits of the informed traders are higher with
dual trading while trading volume and gross losses of the uninformed
traders are unaffected. This effect of the ban on the uninformed is the
same irrespective of whether they act as noise traders or as rational,
risk-averse hedgers.
Commission rates charged by the broker may decrease when dual
trading is banned if informed trading volume as a proportion of the
broker's total customer trading volume, the broker's fixed costs and the
amount of information in the market are high. Net profits of the
informed and net losses of the uninformed both increase when dual
trading is banned.

Dual trading refers to the practice of brokers trading for their
own accounts in addition to bringing their customers' orders to the
market. The practice has, over the years, generated intense controversy
with proponents of dual trading vouching for its salutary effects on
market liquidity and price efficiency and opponents emphasizing the
potential conflicts of interest between dual trading brokers and their
customers. On the regulatory front, the anti-dual-trading camp
currently holds sway with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) banning
dual trading in all active contracts effective May 20, 1991. The issue
is by no means settled, as the Exchange still faces great resentment
over the ban. 1
I develop a model to study how a ban on dual trading will affect
aggregate market characteristics (total trading volume, market depth and
price efficiency) . I also study its distributional effects by looking
at the impact on brokers' commission rates as well as the trading
volumes and profits (both gross and net of commission costs) of the
informed and the uninformed traders. The main conclusion is that the
market impact of dual trading is minimal, but that uninformed traders
tend to benefit at the expense. of the informed traders.
The microstructure of the basic model follows Kyle (1985).
Uninformed noise traders and a group of m informed traders submit
market orders to a broker who places them (along with her own orders)
with a marketmaker for execution. The marketmaker batches the total
order flow and executes them at a single price. The price is determined
by assuming that the marketmaker makes zero profits conditional on
observing the total order flow.
The broker's motive for dual trading comes from her private
observations of the size of her customers' orders. In equilibrium,
she is able to infer all of her informed customers' information from her
observations and profit through mimicking or piggybacking on the
informed trades. Because their orders are now executed at a higher (in
absolute value) price, the broker's piggybacking hurts the informed
traders, who react by restricting their order sizes. Thus, informed
trading volume is higher when dual trading is banned.
However, total trading volume is unaffected by a ban on dual
trading. This is because, with dual trading, the broker's own trading
activity exactly makes up for the slack in informed trading volume. As
a result, market depth, price informativeness and the price level are
also the same with or without dual trading. It follows that the profits
of the informed (ignoring commission costs) are lower with dual trading.
Finally, total trading (i.e., informed plus dual trading) profits are
identical across markets and, therefore, so are the losses of the noise
traders
.
These results are unchanged when the basic model is extended to
allow for rational behavior by uninformed traders. Following Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992), uninformed traders (who are risk-averse) trade
in order to "hedge" their endowments of shares of the risky asset.
Since total informed trading volume (of the informed customers and the
broker 5 ) are equal with or without dual trading, then so are the
riskiness of the market and the trading volume of the "hedgers."
Next, I analyze trading behavior when investors have to pay
commission rates. Suppose that commission rates are proportional to the
order size. Informed traders exploit their information signals less
because of commission costs, reducing the informativeness of the order
flow to the marketmaker. Traders conjecture, therefore, that market
depth has two components: a "direct" adverse selection component as in
Kyle (1985) plus an "indirect" adverse selection effect equal to the
commission rate.
With this formulation, the equilibrium market depth is exactly the
same as in the model without commission rates. This is because the
marketmaker must make zero expected profits in either case and the
amount of information used by informed traders do not change. So, the
marketmaker must reduce the "direct" adverse selection component to
exactly offset the effect of the commission rate. Informed trading
volume and the informativeness of the order flow are restored to their
pre-commission-rate values.
As in Fishman and Longstaff (1992), it is assumed the broker
incurs fixed and variable costs of brokerage. Further, the brokerage
business is competitive so that the broker's total income (trading
profits plus commission income) is zero. Then, a ban on dual trading
may actually reduce commission rates because the broker can more than
offset her loss of trading profits through higher commission income
(since informed trading volume is higher).
Commission fees paid by the informed (as well as the combined
amount paid by all of the broker's customers) are always lower with dual
trading. But, this is not enough to offset the reduction in informed
gross profits and so net profits of the informed traders are always
lower with dual trading. Similarly, although uninformed traders may pay
more commission fees (if commission rates are higher with dual trading),
their losses net of commission costs are always lower than with dual
trading.
Roell (1990) has a model of dual trading in which a broker
observes the trade of some uninformed traders. Uninformed traders
benefit because, through separation from informed traders, they are able
to obtain a better price. In Fishman and Longstaff (1992), the broker
has private information about whether her customer is informed or
uninformed. Their results on the effect of dual trading on the gross
and net trading profits of the informed and the uninformed are identical
to the ones here. However, they assume that trading volume is fixed at
one unit. As a result, the informed trader in their model fails to take
into account the broker's mimicking behavior when formulating her
optimal trading strategy. A further implication of this assumption is
that the broker's commission rates are always lower with dual trading.
They also do not model the behavior of the customer when she is
uninformed. On the other hand, they allow the customer and the dual
trader to trade at different prices and they also model the effect of
frontrunning by the broker.
My results on the market impact of dual trading are broadly
consistent with the empirical work of Park and Sarkar (1992), who find
that market depth is unaffected by a restriction on dual trading in the
S&P 500 futures market and that total trading volume decreased, but only
by about 4.59%. Also, a study by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (1989) find that customers of dual trading brokers do not
obtain significantly different bid-ask spreads relative to customers of
exclusive brokers. However, the results are inconsistent with the work
of Smith and Whaley (1990), who find an average increase of 33% in the
effective bid-ask spread when studying the same set of restrictions on
dual trading analyzed by Park and Sarkar (1992). In addition, Walsh and
Dinehart (1991) find some evidence that dual trading is associated with
narrower bid-ask spreads.
Section I develops the basic dual trading model with noise
traders, ignoring commission costs. In section II, this is contrasted
with a model where dual trading is completely banned. Results on the
market impact of dual trading are obtained. Section III extends the
basic model to introduce the effect of proportional commission rates on
the informed traders' optimal trading strategy. Then, the effect of
dual trading on commission rates and traders' net profits is explored.
Section IV further extends the model to allow for rational behavior by
uninformed traders. Proportional commission rates are re-introduced
into this extended model and their effect analyzed. The study concludes
in section V. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
I. THE DUAL TRADING MODEL AND SOLUTION
A. The Dual Trading Model
I consider a market in which a single risky asset with unknown
liquidation value v is traded. There is a group of m informed traders
each of whom receive, prior to trading, signals s' about the unknown
value v. The signals are of the form s' = v + e',i = l,...,m where the
error terms e 1 are independent of each other. In addition, there is a
group of uninformed noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
Initially, the uninformed traders' motives for trading are not modelled.
Later, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior by the
uninformed traders.
Each informed trader i = l,...,m submits a market order x 1 to a
broker. The noise traders also collectively submit market orders worth
u to the same broker. The latter then places the total of the submitted
m
orders (xd+u), where xd = ^ x
x
, to a marketmaker for execution. 6 In
i-l
the dual trading model, the broker may also trade an amount d for her
own account. She may want to do so because, by observing the market
orders x 1 of the informed, she is able to infer some or all of their
information s 1 . The act of dual trading makes the broker a de facto
informed trader. 7
It is assumed that, when the broker places her customers' orders
with the marketmaker, she simultaneously sends along her own order d as
well. The marketmaker then fixes a single price pd at which she will
execute the total order flow yd = xd + d + u. Following Kyle (1985),
the marketmaker is assumed to be risk-neutral and competitive.
Conditional on observing yd , she earns zero expected profits.
The random variables in the model are v, u and e 1 , i = l,...,m.
All these variables are normally distributed with zero mean and finite
variances S
v
, S
u
and S
g ,
respectively. Thus the m error terms are drawn
from an identical distribution. 8 In addition, all investors follow
linear trading rules x 1 = Ads',i = l,...,m (for the informed) and
m
d = BY^x 1 (for the broker). This implies that the marketmaker ' s
pricing rule is also linear: P(y<j) = rdyd' wnere V rd *- 3 t *ie
now-familiar market depth parameter.
There are three distinct stages to this trading game:
(1) Informed traders receive their information and decide how much
they want to trade. In making this decision, each informed trader
is aware that, first, she is in competition with the other
informed traders and, second, that the broker will "piggyback" on
the information conveyed by her trading decision. The informed
traders care about the broker's piggybacking because they receive
a less favorable price for their trades as a consequence. Noise
traders simply submit u.
(2) The broker observes u and x 1 and infers that each informed trader
has some information s' ,i = l,...,m. Based on her inferences,
she decides to trade an amount d.
(3) The marketmaker fixes a price pd = rd (xd+u+d) , where pd = E(v|yd )
and so rd = Cov( v,yd ) /Var (yd ) .
This suggests the following solution method. Fix rd and suppose
that each informed trader i = l,...,m has decided to trade some amount
x
1
. From each x 1 the broker infers information s' . She then chooses d
to maximize her expected profits, where the expectation is taken with
respect to the vector (s ,...,sm*). Each informed trader i then chooses
x
1 as a best response to d( s 1 *, . . . , sm*) and the rival informed traders'
decisions x J ,j * i. Finally, rd is obtained from the optimal trading
rules and the marketmaker ' s zero profit assumption.
Depending upon what the equilibrium beliefs of the broker are,
there can be potentially many equilibria to the signalling game between
the informed traders and the broker. Fortunately, in this model, the
signalling game affords a unique solution: there is a single fully
separating equilibrium. In other words, the informed traders'
information is fully revealed to the broker and so s' = s',i = l,...,m
in equilibrium.
B. The Dual Trading Solution
First, I solve the signalling game between the informed traders
and the broker. Given her observations of x. and u, the broker chooses
d to maximize her conditional expected profits E(n |
s
1 *,
. . . , s
m
*,u) , where
n = (v-rdyd )d. From the first-order condition, the optimal
d = [E(v|s , . .
.
,
s
m )-rdxd ]/2rd . The second order condition is satisfied
by rd > 0. Define t = 2v/(2 v+2e ) and note that < t < 1. tisa
measure of the unconditional precision of s',i = l,...,m. For example,
if t = 1 then s 1 is a perfect signal. Then, E( v | s 1 *, . . . , sm*) = ts*/Q
n
where Q = [l+t(m-l)] and s* = J^s 1 '. Therefore, the broker's optimal
i-l
trade is:
d--£C - 2* (i)
2QTd 2
In a separating equilibrium s 1 = s 1 = x'/A^ f°r each i = l,...,m.
So, in equilibrium, the presence of the dual trader will have two
opposite effects on the informed traders' incentive to trade. Suppose
x
1 > (a buy order). If x' is increased, the broker infers that the
informed trader's information is improved and so s 1 is higher as well.
The broker trades more, d is higher and so is the resulting price.
Thus, this signalling effect tends to inhibit informed traders from
trading aggressively.
On the other hand, a higher x 1 also reduces d from the second term
in (1). This is a "second-mover disadvantage" for the broker as she has
to accommodate market orders of any size by the informed and tends to
encourage informed trades. For finite m, however, the signalling effect
always dominates the second mover effect, so that B > in equilibrium
(xd and d always have the same sign). The broker optimally mimics the
"consensus" trading decision of the informed group.
Given (1), each informed trader i chooses x' to maximize her
conditional expected profits E(I Is'), where
Id = /v-rdd-rdx 1_rd ]P x j -rdu\x i . After incorporating the optimal value of
d from equation (1) into I , the first-order condition for x 1 , i * j is:
d
t(1 *Q)si
=rd[x
i +
.5(m-l)E(x^|s 1 )] + J&f£ (2)
Equation (2) says that the marginal value of an additional trade
for the i-th informed trader is equal to its marginal cost. This cost
has two components: the change in the price due to her own and her
rivals' expected trades plus the change in the broker's inference as to
her information.
After using the facts that (i) s' = s' = x'/A. in equilibrium and
(ii) E(s J |s') = ts' for j * i, A. is obtained as the coefficient of s' in
(2):
=
t 2 (m-l) (3)d rdQ(Q+D
10
From (3), Ad = when m = 1. But A. = cannot be a separating
equilibrium since the functions x' = Ads
1
,i = l,...,m are then no longer
invert ible. 11
Lemma 1: When m = 1, there is no solution to the dual trading model.
The result can be interpreted as follows. The inhibiting effect
of the broker's piggybacking or mimicking behavior on any individual
informed trader is inversely related to m, the number of informed
customers the broker has. For m = 1, this inhibiting effect exactly
offsets the marginal value of an extra trade for the individual informed
trader. To see this, notice that the first-order condition (2) for
m = 1 simplifies to:
tis 1^ 1 -) =rdx
i (4)
So, for any x 1 > 0, the marginal cost of an additional trade for the
12informed always exceeds its marginal benefits.
Substituting (3) into (1), the optimal dual trading function is
given by:
d = ^— ( 5 )
t (m-1)
Finally, by using (3) and (5) in conjunction with the marketmaker ' s zero
profit assumption the optimal value of market depth is derived as:
11
jStv
rd
= v ^ (6)
< i+q>/ET
Proposition 1 fully characterizes the dual trading equilibrium.
Proposition 1: If m > 1 and t > 0, there exists an unique solution to
the dual trading model in which x 1 = Ads',i = l,...,m, d = Bxd and
pd = r^d where Ad is given by (3), B by the coefficient of xd in (5) and
rd by (6).
What determines the extent of dual trading in the market? First,
consider the effect of increasing the number of informed traders m on
dual trading d. As m increases, the broker's observation of the trade
of any individual informed trader is less valuable. But, at the same
time, she observes more informed trades. The net effect of increasing m
is to weaken the signalling effect and so reduce d.
The effect of increasing the information precision t is to make
informed trades more sensitive to the information signals and so make
the broker's observations more informative. This tends to increase d.
But, a higher t also increases informed trading volume xd and this tends
to reduce d via the second-mover effect. Thus, d is increasing in t
only if t(m-l) < 1— i.e., if the total amount of information in the
market is sufficiently low. In fact, when t(m-l) < 1, it follows from
(5) that d > xd . Since, informationally speaking, the broker is equal
to m informed traders, it may be said that dual trading dominates the
market if d > x ..
12
Corollary 1: (1) d is decreasing in m. Sign [<5d/6t] = sign [l-t(m-l)].
(2) d > xd if t(m-l) < 1.
II. THE MARKET IMPACT OF DUAL TRADING
In weighing the costs and benefits of dual trading, a regulator
might be interested in its effect on aggregate market characteristics
(total trading volume and profits, market depth and price efficiency) as
well as its distributional effect on individual groups of market
participants. These groups include the informed and uninformed traders
and the broker. The distributional impact of dual trading may be
discerned by considering its effects on the trading volumes of the
informed and the uninformed, the broker's commission rates and
traders' expected profits net of commission costs. The impact of dual
trading on aggregate market characteristics is studied in this section
and the distributional question is analyzed in the next.
A. The Nondual Trading Model
I will compare the dual trading solution obtained in section I
with the solution obtained when dual trading is completely banned. The
broker is then a pure intermediary, bringing her customers' orders to
the market. The resulting trading game is a Cournot-Nash game in
trading quantities. Each informed trader places an order x' with the
broker based on her information s 1 . The broker submits the total order
flow yn = xn + u (where xn is total informed trading volume in the
nondual trading market) to the marketmaker for execution. The price
determined is p„ = r v . Lemma 2 describes the nondual trading
equilibrium.
13
Lemma 2: If there is no dual trading, a solution always exists provided
t > 0. The informed traders trade x 1 = A
n
s' and the price is pn = r^^
where :
a =
t r = v ±n (7)
B. Trading Volume and the Gross Profits, Market Depth and Price
Efficiency
Due to "piggybacking" by the broker, it is reasonable to expect
that xd < xn . The difference in informed trading volume depends upon
the trading intensities A
n
and Ad , as well as the market depth
parameters rd and Tn . But, by inspection of (6) and (7), the market
depth parameters have the same value. So:
x - x, = —
1
where T = T = T (8
n d r(l+Q) '
Wn l X d l n- »
which is positive for t > and s > 0. ts/Q represents what the broker
learns about the unknown v from observing the m-vector of informed
trades. The more informative is this observation, the greater is the
relative shrinkage of informed trades in the dual trading market. The
difference in informed trading volume is also positively related to
market depth, since a deeper market allows the broker to place larger
orders with less concern about its impact on the price.
However, the broker herself provides an additional source of
trading activity in the dual trading market. Now, in general, the
14
difference in total trading volume between the two markets (yd~yn )
depends upon the trading intensities Ad , An and B and the market depth
parameters rd and rp . However:
ts rT, T, , (9)y^" yn = T^t 1^]
and so the difference depends upon the market depth parameters only.
Since the market depth parameters have the same value, total trading
volumes are exactly the same in both markets—the broker's trading
activity precisely offsets the slack in informed trading volume.
In fact, the equality of market depth in the two markets implies
that the informativeness of the total order flow is unchanged. Informed
traders use their information less when there is dual trading, but the
broker also exploits the same information vector so that the total
information usage remains the same. This suggests that price efficiency
PI,-, i = d,n (where PI^ is defined as S
v
- var(v|p- )) is also identical
in both markets. Thus, the aggregate market impact of dual trading is
nil (although distributional effects are present since xd < xn ) .
Let 1^ denote the combined unconditional expected profits of the
informed group (before observing any signals or paying any commissions)
in the i-th market, i = d,n. Since both market depth and total trading
volumes are identical in the two markets, then so is the price level.
Hence, total trading profits must be the same in the two markets, i.e.,
Id + n
= I
n
. From (5), d > in equilibrium whenever t > and m > 1
and so the broker's trading profits n are strictly positive. It follows
15
that Id < I : gross profits of the informed are strictly lower with
dual trading.
As the marketmaker makes zero expected profits, uninformed traders
lose money in equilibrium and the amount of their loss mirrors the total
trading profits of the informed and the broker. Denote L = Id - I n + n
as the difference in the gross losses of the uninformed between the dual
and nondual trading regimes. Therefore, L = 0.
Proposition 2: (1) yd = yn, Id + x I n , rd = rn and PId = PI n . Total
trading volume and gross profits, market depth and price efficiency are
the same with or without dual trading. (2) Id < I n and L = 0. Gross
profits of the informed are lower with dual trading. Gross losses of
the uninformed are unchanged.
III. COMMISSION RATES AND NET TRADING PROFITS
A. A Model of Trading With Commission Rat&s
Suppose that, in market i = d,n, the broker charges a per trade
commission fee of $c^ to cover her costs of brokerage. Agents make
their decisions in the following sequence. At stage zero, the broker
determines the commission rate c- . At stage one, the informed traders
observe their signals and c^. Then, they decide how much to trade.
Noise traders trade u. The rest of the model proceeds as before. Stage
zero is analyzed in section IIIB. The subsequent stages are analyzed
here.
I will assume that the commission rate is quadratic in the trades.
In other words, if trader i buys or sells z 1 shares the commission fee
paid is $c-(z') . This is the most tractable way of ensuring positive
16
commission fees on all trades, whether a buy or sell. Of course, the
optimal trading decisions must now be based on traders' profits, net of
her commission costs. Let z 1 denote the solution to the i-th informed
trader's problem in this case, with Zj indicating the aggregate informed
trading volume in the i-th market, i = d,n. As a short-hand, I will
refer to the model with brokerage costs as the z-model to contrast with
the earlier x-model (based on traders' gross profits).
In defining an equilibrium concept for the z-model, there are two
important modelling issues to contend with. First, the distribution of
z
1 is potentially non-normal because, for realizations of s 1 close to
zero, net profits may be negative if the commission rate is high. Thus,
there could be a no-trade interval around zero. Second, there are
many different ways in which the commission rate c- could interact with
the informed traders' information signals.
Let N. and N- be the j-th informed trader's net profits and the
combined net profits of the informed group in the i-th market, i = d,n.
Still writing y. for the total order flow (with no presumption that its
equilibrium value is unchanged), suppose that traders conjecture the
marketmaker ' s pricing function to be p- = t^, i = d,n. In the nondual
trading market, the expected net profits of the j-th informed trader can
be expressed as:
E^IS 3 ) = [tS^-T nZ^-C nZ^-T nE(z-3|s^)]z^ ( 10 >
where z ~i = ]P z x is the total trading volume of the rival informed
traders.
17
Now, consider an "indirect" formulation of this problem. The
individual informed trader no longer directly takes into account the
amount of commission fees she has to pay. Instead, she conjectures that
p. = (JL-+c-)y-. The logic behind this formulation is as follows. Market
depth is still determined by the marketmaker ' s adverse selection
considerations only. However, it now has two components: a direct
adverse selection effect given by X
f
and an indirect effect caused by
the transactions cost element represented by Cj. An increase in c-
reduces the intensity with which information is exploited, decreasing
the variance of the order flow and so reduces market depth. Thus, for a
given amount of the order flow y^ , the price level and the commission
rate are positively correlated.
In the "indirect" problem, expected net profits of the j-th
informed trader in the nondual trading case is:
E(Nnj |s^) =[ts^-A. nz^-c nz^-(Xn+c n )E(z^|sJ)]z^ i 11 )
Equations (10) and (11) look very similar, except that (11)
contains an extra term which represents the effect on market depth of
the expected commission fees paid by rival informed traders. The
"indirect" analysis for the dual trading case is similar. The broker
does not pay any commission fees. But, since her trades are derived
from the informed trades, it is rational for her to make the same
conjecture as the informed traders do. In equilibrium, such a
conjecture is self-fulfilling.
18
The "indirect" representation has several advantages over the
"direct" formulation. First, for the informed traders, it can be shown
that equilibrium net profits are always positive and so the equilibrium
trading volume is normally distributed. 19 Second, it affords a
closed-form solution which the "direct" model does not. Therefore,
it is the "indirect" formulation that will be followed here. Lemma 3
describes the resulting equilibria.
Lemma 3: The model with proportional commission rates has the same
equilibrium solution as the model without commission rates with
X- + c- = T-, z- = x- and N- = I- for i = d,n.
Lemma 3 says that first, market depth is the same with or without
commission rates. Since the marketmaker is restricted to making zero
profits irrespective of whether commissions are charged or net, the
equilibrium level of depth must be the same if the informativeness of
the order flow is the same. The normality of the equilibrium trading
volume in the z-model ensures that every trade which was feasible
without commission rates is also feasible with commission rates. Hence,
the order flow is equally informative in both cases. This argument also
implies that the equilibrium informed and dual trading volume will be
invariant with respect to the commission rate. Further, equilibrium net
profits in the z-model must equal the equilibrium gross profits in the
x-model.
What is different is the composition of the market depth parameter
in the two cases. The direct adverse selection component of market
depth A.J is smaller in the model with commission costs because, after
19
adjusting for the transactions cost effect, the residual adverse
selection problem is less severe for the marketmaker
.
fl. The Effect, of Dual Trading on Commission Rates
Suppose that the broker faces a fixed cost kQ and a variable cost
k
1
of conducting business, both costs being non-negative. To be
consistent with the representation of the commission rate, it will be
assumed that the variable cost of a trade z' is k.(z') • Following
Fishman and Longstaff (1992), I assume that the brokerage business is
competitive and so the commission rate c^ is chosen such that the
broker's expected trading profits plus expected commission income equals
zero. To avoid introducing further notation, I will write z
;
, i = d,n
and u to mean E[(z
i
)
2
] and E(u2 ), respectively. Then the broker's
commission rates with (c.) and without (c
n
) dual trading must satisfy:
c = k. + ^L (12)1 z.+u
c n
= k
1
+ ^- (13)
x
z +u
Note that, if expected customer trading volume is the same in both
markets (as in Fishman and Longstaff (1992)), then zd = zn and so cd < cn
of necessity. But if zd < zn (as here), then cd > cn is possible. The
broker can offset the loss of her trading profits when dual trading is
banned through higher commission income generated by the greater volume
of customer trades and thus maintain lower commission rates c
n
.
Proposition 3 fully characterizes the relationship between cd and c n .
20
Proposition 3: Sign(c d -c n ) = sign/ko-./mt^ J3u ) " cd < cn " likelY for
higher values of uninformed trading E
u
and lower values of the fixed
brokerage cost kn and total information mt.
To explain proposition 3, it would be helpful to express the
difference in commission rates in terms of their basic parameters, thus:
c d cn ~ N) Z.+U Z +U Z.+U
(14)
According to (14), fixed costs per unit of customer trading volume are
higher with dual trading since zd < zn . This tends to make cd > c n . If
fixed costs are small and uninformed trading volume u is large relative
to total customer trading volume, this factor becomes relatively small
in magnitude. In addition, the broker's trading profits allow her to
reduce commission rates with dual trading. From corollary 1, if the
amount of information mt is small then dual trading is extensive and, by
implication, so are dual trading profits. This tends to make cd < cn .
The difference in commission fees paid by the informed can be
expressed as:
cdz d " c nzn ~ ^0
Zd z n
z d +uz d +u zn+u
-kl( z n- z d) (15)
The proportion of fixed costs paid for by the informed (relative
to that by the uninformed) is lower with dual trading and so is the
burden of the broker's variable costs borne by them. In addition, a
21
proportion of dual trading profits also serves to reduce the commission
costs of the informed. Hence all three terms in the right hand side
(RHS) of (15) are negative; the informed always pay lower commission
fees with dual trading.
For the uninformed traders, however, since their trading volume is
fixed at u, the difference in their commission fees is simply equal to
the increase in the proportion of the fixed costs paid for by
them—adjusted by the share of dual trading profits used to reduce their
commission costs:
u(c d -cn ) = iJ-S- - -H^l - n^^ (16)\an; o^
Zd +U Z d +U j Z d +U
Considering (15) and (16) together, the difference in commission
costs paid by all customers between the dual and the nondual trading
markets is:
c d (z d +u) - c n (z n +u) = - n - k1 (zn-z d ) < (17)
Since the fixed costs must be fully paid for in both markets, it does
not enter into (17). Total commission costs for customers are lower in
the dual trading market because the broker's trading profits cushion
part of the costs and because the broker's variable costs are lower (due
to the reduced customer trading volume)
.
Let I
lz
be the gross profits of the informed traders in the
z-model for market i = d,n. Then, the difference in the gross losses of
the uninformed between the dual and the nondual trading markets is given
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by L = I dz - I nz + n. Where previously (in the model without commission
costs) L_ = 0, it can be shown that now L = c.z. - cz„ < — i.e., L„
g gdann g
reflects the difference in commission costs paid by the informed
traders. The reason is that, in equilibrium, informed traders are fully
compensated by the marketmaker for their commission costs through the
adjustment in market depth. Thus, it is the uninformed traders who
(indirectly) pay for the informed traders' commission costs.
The difference in uninformed net losses are L = L„ + u(c.-c ).
n g v a n
'
From the discussion above, L
n
can be expressed as the difference between
total commission costs paid by customers in the two markets:
K c d ( z d +u ) " c n (z n +u) (18)
which, from (17), is negative—uninformed net losses decrease with dual
trading.
The net profits of the informed traders are N^ = I jz - c^z^.
Informed traders pay lower commission costs with dual trading, but this
is not sufficient to fully offset a reduction in their gross profits.
To see this, note that the difference in informed net profits between
the dual and the nondual trading markets simply mirrors the difference
in uninformed net losses (after adjusting for changes in the informed
trading volumes):
Nd - Nn = Ln + k1 (Zn-Zd ) (19)
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From (17), (18) and ( 19 ) , Nd - Nn = -n < 0. The result is intuitive
since, from lemma 3, informed net profits in the z-model have the same
equilibrium values as informed gross profits in the x-model.
Proposition 4 summarizes the results on commission rates and customers'
net profits.
Proposition 4: (1) c.(x.+u) < c n ( xn+u ) an<* c <*icm < c nxn* Commission costs
of all customers, as well as that of the informed separately, are lower
with dual trading. (2) N d < Nn . Informed net profits are lower with
dual trading. (3) L
n
< 0. Net losses of the uninformed are also lower
with dual trading.
So far, the trading motivations of uninformed traders have not
been modelled. In the next section, the basic model is extended to
allow for rational behavior by uninformed traders.
IV. HEDGING BY UNINFORMED TRADERS
Initially, suppose that there are no commission costs. Later, I
will indicate how the results generalize with the introduction of
proportional commission costs.
A. The Model With Uninformed Traders as Rational Hedgers
There are h risk-averse uninformed traders ("hedgers") who trade
for purely risk-sharing reasons. The development of the model here
follows Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). Each hedger j has random
endowment w J
,
which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance E
w
. w J
, j = l,...,h are independent of each other and all
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other random variables in the model. All hedgers have negative
exponential utility functions with risk-aversion parameter R.
Suppose that all hedgers submit market orders u J to the broker and
follow linear trading rules of the form u J = Dw J
, j = l,...,h. Let the
h
total uninformed trading volume be u = Tu^. If n. is the profit of
the j-th hedger in market i = d,n, then u J is chosen to maximize her
utility or certainty-equivalent profits V. = [E(»r. jw-) - — Var (n. | w. ) ] .
Let Vj , i = d,n be the sum of the utilities of all h hedgers in the i-th
market. The informed traders and the broker's maximization problem
remains the same as before, since each w J is independent of v. 21
Market depth is now positively related to the magnitude of the "hedge
factor" D22 (since this increases the variance of the total order flow)
and to the risk aversion parameter R. Further, the equilibrium D <
since the marginal utility of the hedgers from a purchase (sale) is
negative if endowments are positive (negative) . Lemma 4 describes the
equilibrium.
Lemma 4: An equilibrium to the hedger model exists if R satisfies
equation (A20) in the appendix. In equilibrium, each hedger j = l,...,h
trades u J = D-w J , where 0- < 0, market depth is 1/0 , i = d,n and:
iiA^-C (20)
T = r
rf
= r
n
is defined in (6) or (7) and Dj in equation (A19) of the
appendix .
As in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), equilibrium exists if the
amount of risk-aversion and noise in the market exceeds the amount of
25
information available. Notice that the RHS of (20) is independent of i.
Further, since total informed trading volume is the same function of 6-
in both markets, 8d (x.+d) = 8 x . In other words, equilibrium informed
trades have the same impact on the price level in both markets and so
the variance of uninformed profits must also be the same across the two
markets. Thus, the amount of risk and so the number of shares hedged by
the uninformed traders are equal between the dual and the nondual
trading markets: Dd = D n . From (20), 8d = n and by implication
V. = V
n
. Hence, the conclusion that dual trading has no aggregate
market impact remains unchanged when uninformed traders behave
rationally.
Proposition 5: Dd = Dn , Vd = Vn and 8d = 8 n . The hedgers' trading
volume and gross utility and the depth of the market are the same with
or without dual trading.
B, The Effect of Proportional Commission Rates
From the discussion in section IIIA, the commission rate affects
trading volume through the market depth parameter only. Since the
latter is determined solely on the marketmaker ' s adverse selection
considerations, 8-, i = d,n does not change with the introduction of
proportional commission rates. So, the equilibrium value of D does not
change either. Further, since the hedgers' trading volume is equal
across the dual and the nondual trading markets, the comparison between
the dual and nondual trading markets put forth in section IIIB is still
valid here. In particular, proposition 4 holds precisely as stated.
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A remaining issue of interest is whether there are parameter
values for which commission rates are higher with dual trading in the
noise trader solution, but are lower in the current model? In comparing
the noise trader model to the hedger model, the pivotal variable is the
expected volume of uninformed trading. If this were greater in the
hedger model," then (since neither the total information nor the
brokerage costs have changed) it follows from proposition 3 that cd < cn
would be more likely as well. Corollary 2 states conditions under which
cd < cn in the hedger model and, simultaneously, cd > cn in the noise
trader model.
Corollary 2: If |D| ,/hy^~ > k > J£~~ r then cd > cn in the noise trader
model but c. < c in the hedger model .
The following example illustrates this corollary. Suppose that
S
u
= S
H
= S
v
= 1. Let kQ = 1.2, t = 0.5 and m = 2. Then
JmtJ? J^ = 1 < k and so from proposition 3, cd > cn in the noise trader
model. Now, let R = 2 and h = 4. Then, from equations (A19) and (A21)
in the appendix, |d| =0.71 and |D|./h^^~ = 1.42 > k and so cd < c n in the
hedger model. High values of the risk-aversion parameter and the number
of hedgers make this result likely.
For a larger set of parameter values, when cd > cn in the noise
trader model, cd < c n is possible (but not guaranteed) in the hedger
model. If the amount of noise is pegged at the same level in the two
models, only the weaker condition that the uninformed traders
"overhedge" is required. No restrictions are needed on the fixed cost
kQ . This is stated in Corollary 3.
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Corollary 3: Suppose S
u
= hEy . Then, if |d| > 1, there will be some
parameter values for which cd > cn in the noise trader model and c . < c
in the hedger model. |d| > 1 if A./^ £„ mt > 2(1+Q) VVH# which is
satisfied for high values of A and £
u
and for h < mt.
V. CONCLUSION
Dual trading has no aggregate market impact since total trading
volume, market depth and price efficiency are all invariant with respect
to a ban on dual trading. However, the dual trading activity comes at
the expense of other informed traders who are the broker's customers.
These informed traders restrict their trading volume in anticipation of
the broker mimicking their trades and "piggybacking" on their
information.
The reduction in the business of informed customers leads to a
loss in commission income for the broker if dual trading is permitted.
If this loss is greater than the broker's trading profits, then
commission rates may increase with dual trading. This is likely if the
broker's fixed brokerage costs, the total amount of information in the
market and informed trading as a proportion of total customer trades are
high. Informed profits and uninformed losses, both gross and net of
commission costs, are lower with dual trading.
The basic model is extended to model uninformed traders as
risk-averse hedgers. Since total informed trading (of informed traders
plus the broker) is identical with or without dual trading, the hedgers
also trade the same amount in both markets. Although the comparison
between the two regulatory regimes remains unchanged, parameter values
are derived under which commission rates will be lower with dual trading
28
in the hedger model but will be higher with dual trading in the noise
trader model.
J-AS. 10-32
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FOOTNOTES
1 See The Chicago Tribune , February 4, 1992 and The Wall Street
Journal , February 7, 1992 for details.
^Later, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior
by uninformed traders.
The broker is assumed to have no private information of her own.
For a model with a privately informed broker, see Sarkar (1991).
The assumption of a batch market maximizes the negative impact of
piggybackers on informed trading. But the effect would remain in a
setting where the orders of the customers and the broker are executed
(and priced) separately, so long as some subset of the informed
customers make repeat purchases or sales via the same broker. From Kyle
(1985), the optimal dynamic trading strategy of an informed trader is in
fact to dribble her trades over time.
By virtue of being able to infer the information of her informed
customers, the broker can be considered to be a de facto informed
trader
.
I will adopt the convention of labelling the decision variables of
individual agents with a superscript and market variables with a
subscript. The subscript d will refer to the solution in the dual
trading model and the superscript n to the nondual trading solution.
The broker is assumed to have no independent information regarding
v. In a previous version of this paper (Sarkar (1991)), the broker had
her own information and m = 1. This made for some interesting
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interactions between the information of the single insider and that of
the broker. For example, for low precision of the broker's information,
the insider's trades is actually decreasing in the precision of her own
information!
8For m = 2, I have checked that the results are unchanged if the
informed traders have information of different precisions. I conjecture
that this is true for general m.
9The exposition in this section follows Mailath (1987).
10Depending upon the realization of their information signals, some
informed traders may place buy orders and others sell orders. If
x. > 0, then the buy signals are stronger and d > also. Notice that
x . = is not ruled out.
11This result is similar in spirit to a corollary in Gould and
Verrecchia (1985), where a privately informed specialist sets a price
which is then observed by a single trader. They show that equilibrium
does not exist if the trader has no private information of her own.
12 In Sarkar (1991), an equilibrium exists even with m = 1 so long
as the precision of the broker's information is positive. The reason is
that, if the broker has an independent source of information about v,
she attaches relatively less weight to her observation of the informed
trade. The change in the broker's inference, when the informed trader
buys or sells an extra share, no longer fully offsets the marginal value
of that extra share traded.
13The reason is that, although the signal realizations are
distinct, they all pertain to a single asset. Thus, much of the
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additional information obtained by the broker is redundant. Formally,
there are m(m-l) covariance terms for m distinct signals.
14Since in the model so far, the trading volume of the uninformed
is not a choice variable, this particular question is deferred until
section IV (when I do model the uninformed trading decision)
.
1
'This interpretation of a nondual trading market as one where the
broker does not trade at all appears to be consistent with market
realities (for example, the S&P 500 index futures market where such a
ban is currently effective). In the previous version of this paper
(Sarkar, 1991) the broker was assumed to be independently informed and
this raised troubling issues as to what happens to the broker's
information when dual trading is banned. A related issue concerns the
choice of brokers. If some brokers can commit not to dual trade (as
occurs in reality) , why should all customer trades not be redirected to
them? Since customers do in fact continue to knowingly patronize dual
trading brokers (in futures markets, the broker has to announce her
intention to dual trade at the beginning of the trading day), it must be
the case that these brokers provide customers benefits not available
from nondual trading brokers. For example, Grossman (1989) has
conjectured that the opportunity to engage in dual trading rewards
brokers with superior trading skills. Thus, my model should be seen as
a reduced form of this more general situation where traders and brokers
are matched according to their varying needs. I thank the Editor,
Douglas W. Diamond, for bringing these points to my attention.
I wish to thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out to
me.
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Here are two examples. z 1 = F^s' with A. > F-. Here the
commission rate lowers the trading intensity. Or, z' = x' - T-c. Here,
the trading intensity A- is unchanged. But T jf the marginal effect of c
on the trading volume, could be affected by A
(
.
18
°Thus, a fixed per trade commission would not affect market depth
by this argument.
19This is because, in eguilibrium, net profits in the z-model are
egual to the eguilibrium gross profits in the x-model.
The solution for the "direct" representation involves a cubic
equation in the market depth parameter.
210f course, the actual informed and dual trading volumes will be
different since market depth will be different, in general.
22The "hedge factor" is different from the hedge ratio familiar in
the futures/options literature since, here, the asset being used for
hedging purposes is the same one that is being hedged. I am grateful to
Bjorn Flesaker for explaining this to me.
23Of course, a comparison of the actual uninformed trading volume
is not meaningful since it is not a choice variable in the noise trader
model. However, the expected noise trading volume and the equilibrium
expected hedging volume can be compared.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
m
Let E(v|s 1 , . . . , sm ) = as , where s* = J^s 1 *. Applying Bayes
'
i/E t
rUlS
'
a
^
!/£, + "/£.
=
*+ <*-»* ' ^^ t
= V(Sv+Se)
* ^^
giVSS
the optimal dual trade d(s ,xd ) as given in (1).
Incorporating (1), each informed trader i's profits I can be
d
written as:
Mv -Trr^mir-T x«- r«u )
I -x 1Substituting s 1 = s 1 = — for each i = l,...,m into (Al):
(Al)
Efldis 1 ) - ts 1 - 4^ rH +2 I d l+(m-l)t Ad
_ y E(x^|s 1 ) fr + t _1
hi 2 d l+(m-l)t A,
(A2)
Substituting E(x J |s 1 ) = A
cJ
ts 1 for each j * i into (A2) and then
differentiating with respect to x 1 gives (2). When m = 1, (2) has the
form:
x i(_L +rd l = ts 1 (A3)
It is easily checked that there is no A. > such that x 1 = A.s' has a
solution.
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Proof of Proposition 1
xd [l+t(m-l)]From (5), yd = xd + d + u = t (m - 1 )
+ u
'
or;
yd = r^ ^ ,
S
, v -i
' tt-
+ u, where s = Y* s i (A4)
(6) follows from solving Td = covariance (v,yd ) /variance (yd )
•
Proof of Corollary 1
From (3), (5) and (6), d = -*-— ' ^* 3 . Ignoring terms unrelated
to m and t,
-f^ =
1 "t(m " 1)
> o for t(m-l) < 1.
fi t 2Q 2 v/mt
5m Ov/inl 2m 0/
Proof of Lemma 2
Each informed trader "i" chooses x 1 to maximize E(I |s'), where:
i tt
d
= Kxi-rTxnx 1 (A5)
The first-order condition for x' yields:
x l = |^[i-(m-i)rA] < A6 >
Solving (A6) yields the eguilibrium value for A
n
. Solving for T
n
in the
usual way, (7) is obtained. From the proof of proposition 1:
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Proof of Proposition 2
(1) From (A7), it follows that yd = yn since rd = Tn . Since
y . = xd + d + u and yn = xn + u, it follows that xd < xn since d > for
finite m. Price informativeness PI-,i = d,n is defined as:
Pli = J^ - Variance (v|Pi ) = itj^ (A8)
Since rd = rn and yd = yn , Pl d = PI n .
(2) I- = E([v-p-]x-) is the total unconditional expected profits
of the informed traders in market i = d,n. I d < I n since pd = pn and
xd < xn«
I d + n = E([v-pd ][xd +d])
- E([v-p
n ]xn ) = I n .
Proof of Lemma 3
Differentiating (11) with respect to z J :
ZJ =
2(Vcn ) '[l-ta-DMVCn)]
<
A9
>
Solving for A„ from (A9), A_ = —
;
—
. Solving for
i/mt >
(Xn+C) , (vc) = v %_ -rn .
The proof for the dual trading case is similar.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (12) and (13) in the text:
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Cd"Cn = x.+u
(x -x„
yn
- 71 (A10)
lince x
n
, xd and u are E(xn ) , E(xd )
2 and E(u2 ), we have:
^WV
_
^—»Xl
or2 (i+o) 2 Q
(All)
y n = Eu < 1+Q> (A12)
Tt = f^KQ(l+Q) (A13)
Substituting (A11)-(A13) into (A10), the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
By definition, N- = I- + c^z^ for i = d,n. From lemma 3, N- = 1^
and so
j
L
g =
l dz - inz + «
= I d - In + 71 + cdz d - cnz n
= c dz d - cn zn from part 1 of proposition 2
Ln = Lg + U (Cd"Cn )
= C d( Zd +U ) ~ Cn( Z n +U )
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Proof of Lemma 4
«J = v(u ] +W) - 6 tiU j /u j +D i]Tw m+xi \ (A14)
where xd is total informed ( including dual) trades. From the
ts
maximization problem of the informed traders, 8,x, = —- for i = d,nc x x 1+0
E(*\\v*) = -^(ui)' (A15)
E(*i|w3) = -e.(uJ) 2
Var(7t?|w j ) = E vw ^ +u ^l v- ts— -QiDiF
= £,<" J > 2 + (u^) 2[Ev (i-i^P^j * (e1Dl)'<h-i>£ li
+ 2V UJWJ (2 " t}
^-*V 1+Q
(A16)
Differentiating V. with respect to u J and then equating Dj with
the coefficient of w J in the resulting first-order condition yields:
RD^(h-i)^ +Di
[
2ei+R^(i--^L|
(2-t)
*-*r Q + l
(A17)
Solving for 8-:
(A18)
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It follows from (A18) that since 8j > to satisfy the second-order
condition for the informed traders, D- < in equilibrium. Substituting
for 6,D- in (A17) and solving for D-:
1
_ RVmt
RT (2-t)- r#-r^~ h(Q + l)
(A19)
Since D- < 0, equilibrium exists if:
Ry ( 2 -t) > V ^ (A20)
The denominator of D- in (A19) is always positive, so (A20) is
sufficient. To show this, rewrite the denominator as:
Denom = R^^ 1 _mt(Q+2) (h-l)mt
(Q +D 2 J h(Q + l) 2
R^ [(1-t) (4+mt)+t: 2 ] + (h
"1)m
^
(Q + l) 2 h(Q + l) 2
>
In the second step, the definition Q = 1 + t(m-l) has been used.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since the RHS of (A19) is independent of i, Dd = Dn . Since the
RHS of (A18) is independent of i, 6d = 8 n given that Dd = Dn . It follows
from inspection of (A15) and (A16) that V"d = Vn .
39
Proof of Corollary 2
From proposition 3, cd < cn if k < ipitV~ J? • Since E(u
2
) = hD 2S
fc
in the hedger model, the appropriate condition now is:
k < \D\ft£;fiz; < A2l >
where |d| is the absolute value of D. The result follows immediately
from a comparison of proposition 3 and (A21).
Proof of Corollary 3
If £u =h£,- ko < /^EvEu < wfi^fiE when I D I > l -
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